Florida\u27s Corporate Code: Draftsmanship and Practice by Trau, David M.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 12 Number 1 Article 6 
10-1-1957 
Florida's Corporate Code: Draftsmanship and Practice 
David M. Trau 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
David M. Trau, Florida's Corporate Code: Draftsmanship and Practice, 12 U. Miami L. Rev. 63 (1957) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol12/iss1/6 
This Leading Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of 
Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
FLORIDA'S CORPORATE CODE: DRAFTSMANSHIP
AND PRACTICE
DAVID M. TRAU t
The art of drafting corporate charters and other corporate documents
has lost much significance in recent years. Attorneys, for the most part,
are more than willing to use forms, heedless of the echoes which may
come back at a later time when the enterprise has reached the going
concern stage. A "form type" of approach is, first of all, easier. It seems
more expedient and uniform, but it is also "playing by car." It is the
writer's firm opinion that time spent on careful draftsmanship of the
charter is time well spent. One of the main objectives of this article is
to point out some of the pitfalls in the corporate code which lie ready
to ensnare the work of the careless draftsman, and how these may be
avoided through close attention to the purposes which the enterprise seeks
to accomplish.
I. THE INCORPORATORS
The Code provides that "three or more" incorporators are necessary
for corporations organized under the general corporation law.' This obvious
observation may become of considerable importance to the attorney
organizing the new enterprise.
First of all, with regard to the minimum figure, it is common practice
for attorneys to use the client and two "dummies" who subsequently
assign their shares, with the result that the enterprise takes the form
of a one-man corporation. Aside from situations where the one-man
corporation has been used for evasion of statutes,2 fraud on creditors,3
or for similar evasive purposes,4 the practice has been given full sanction by
the courts. The limited liability is not affected by the fact that ownership
of all the shares rests with one or two individuals. As stated in a leading
English case, "Not only do these companies (one-man corporations)
exist under the sanction, even with the encouragement of the legislature,
but I have no reason whatever to doubt that the great majority are as
bona fide and genuine as in a business sense they are convenient and
suitable for the provision and application of capital to industry."'5
*Member of the Florida Bar.
The author wishes to express his sincere gratitude for the helpful and valuable
suggestions, criticisms and co-operation of Hugh L. Sowards, Professor of Law, University
of Miami, in the preparation of this article.
1. FLA. STAT. § 608.03 (1955).
2. See United States v. Milwaukee Transit Co. 142 Fed. 247 (7th Cir. 1905).
3. See Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (1941).
4. See Fuller, The Incorporated Individual, 51 HARv. L. REv. 1373 (1938).
5. Younger, L.J., in Inland Revenue Comm'rs. v. Samson, [1921] 2 K.B. 492,
125 L.T.R. 37. See also Advertects, Inc. v. Sawyer Industries, 84 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1955).
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In what is apparently a case of first impression in America, however,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina has struck at the heart of one-man
(and two-mcnc) corporations by holding squarely that there must be
three or more "stockholders at all times in order for a legal corporate
entity to exist.6  lihc reasoning iii this startling case proceeded on the
basis that because the statutes of North Carolina require three or more
persons to obtain a certificate of incorporation and to manage the affairs
of the corporation, a corporation with a single stockholder is a "dormant"
corporation. Therefore, the corporate entity can be disregarded, and
anyone seeking legal redress against the corporation may look immediately
to the "one man." Understandably, this decision has generated much
concern among lawyers and busincssnien in North Carolina . Attorneys
in Florida and other jurisdictions should not dismiss this case lightly, for
the North Carolina statutory language in question" is markedly similar
to that of Florida and most other states.
The absence of any maxinum figure ("three or more") is of more
immediate practical importance to attorneys, especially in situations where
the enterprise expects to solicit funds from the public. The point is that
the Florida Securities Act"' applies to public offerings of securities by
the corporation, i.e., sales of securities to persons not members of the
corporate group. In turn, a public offering involves considerable time
and expense. But the provisions of the Florida Securities Act do not
operate if the subscribers are bona fide incorporators. In short, incorpora-
tors are looked upon as a closed group and no element of a public
offering is present. Thus, since there is no maximum linit provided for
incorporators, funds from more than three persons may be obtained, free
from registration under the Florida Securities Act.
II. Tim COiPORATri. NAME
In Florida there is no statutory provision for reservation of the
corporate name. However, the Secretary of State may not issue articles
of incorporation to a corporation unless its proposed name is "such as
will distinguish it from any other corporation authorized to do business
6. Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 241 N.C. 473, 85 S.E.2d 677
(1955); rehearing, 243 N.C. 595, 91 S.E.2d 584 (1956).
7. "Not possessing the managerial agencies--stockholders, directors or officers,-
contemplated by statute, it can no longer act as a corporation. Its decisions are
the decisions of the single stockholder, and its action is his action." Id. at 597, 91
S.E.2d at 586.
8. For a critical comment on the case see Comment, A Conceptualistic Tangle
and The One-or Two.Man Corporation, 34 N.CL. RE;'. 471 (1956).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2 (1953).
10. FLA. STAT. e. 517 (1955).
11. This discussion assumes that no solicitation is involved. Rather, that the More
than three persons are bona fide incorporators.
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in Florida."' 2' It is therefore advisable to communicate with his office
shortly prior to filing the application for charter in order to ascertain
whether the proposed name is available for use.
Several restrictions must be observed in sclectiug a name for corporate
use. First, the statute expressly provides that the name must include the
word "company, "corpora hon," "incorporated," "or such other word,
abbreviation, affix or prefix as will clearly indicate that it is a corporation
instead of a natural person or partnership.''
3'
The statute also expressly provides that the name must be "such as
will distinguish it from any other corporation authorized to do business
in Florida." It is to be noted in this connection that foreign as well as
domestic corporations enjoy the protection of this section, as long as the
foreign corporation in question is authorized to do business in Florida.
Suppose, however, that the foreign corporation is not authorized to do
business in Florida. Theoretically, then, use by a Florida corporation of
a name similar to that of a foreign corporation would be lawful. Actually,
however, if public deception results, the foreign corporation may obtain
an injunction prohibiting use of the name by the domestic corporation.'
By way of illustration, suppose that the Coca-Cola Company was not
authorized to do business in Florida. Obviously, adoption of that well
known name by another corporation for use in Florida would result in
public deception.ra Close questions may arise, however, as to what con-
stitutes "public deception." It has been stated that "generic, geographical
or descriptive terms, such as the name of a city or locality or a product
or industry or even a personal or family name, arc given somewhat less
protection than more peculiar, fanciful or artificial names."' ' One point
however is clear. The fact that the Secretary of State approves use of the
corporate name is not determinative of the corporation's legal right to
use it. His decision is reviewable by the courts. 7 Nor is good faith of
the incorporators a defense.' 8 The careful attorney, then, should engage
12. FLA. STAT. § 608.03 (1955). See also, FLA. STAT. § 608.61 (1955). Another
section of this code provides that articles of incorporation may not be issued to veterans
organizations not officially affiliated with one of the national congressionally recognized
veteran organizations.
13. FLA. STAT. § 608.03 (1955). Attention is called to another section of the
code providing that no corporation for profit may use the term "club" so as to
misrepresent itself as a religious, charitable, educational or like association. See also
FuA. STAT. §§ 608.63 through 608.66 (1955).
14. Scalise v. National Utility Service, Inc., 120 Fed. 938 (7th Cir. 1941).
15. Actually there is a distinction between protection of the corporate name and
protection of trade names and trademarks. However, most cases have proceeded from
th practical premise that protection of the corporate name is in reality a branch of
th law of unfair competition. See American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S.
372 (1925). Note, Right to Exclusive Use of Corporate Name, 28 CA. L. Rrv.
766 (1940).
16. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 285 (1946 ed.)
17. See Children's Bootery v. Sutkcer, 91 Fla. 60, 107 So. 345 (1926). This
protection also extends to religious organizations. First Born Church of the Living God
v. First Born Church of the Living God, 156 Fla. 78, 22 So.2d 452 (1945).
18. Children's Booten' v. Sutker, 91 Fla. 60, 107 So. 345 (1926).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAw REVIEW
in close investigation before recommending adoption of a corporate name
if there is any doubt in his mind concerning a subsequent challenge on
its exclusive use.
Ill. THE CAPITALIZATION
Perhaps the most important phase of organization procedure con-
cerns the initial capitalization of the enterprise. What types of securities
to authorize and in what proportion such securities are to be issued among
the incorporators often presents a difficult problem.
Par and No-Par Shares
One of the first factors to consider in this respect is control of the
enterprise. Usually, distribution of voting shares among the initial sub-
scribers will approximate their rcspective contributions in money or
money's worth. Thus A, B, and C, incorporators, who each subscribe
equally, will agree to, and expcct, an equal division of voting shares. If
the "close corporation"9 is the objective of A, B, and C, the problem
is a relatively simple one. The first and most obvious allocation method
involves the use of $1.00 par value voting common stock. Suppose that
A, B, and C each contribute $5,000 to the new venture. Each incorporator
will be allotted 5,000 shares of the $1.00 par value stock.20 An alternative
method would involve issuance of no par value stock, A, B, and C again
receiving an equal number of shares. Although the use of no par value
stock has been legalized in nearly every state,2' certain points must be
borne in mind. Where, as in our above illustration, the entire capitali-
zation consists of no par value stock, the minimum statutory requirement
of $500.00 as a condition precedent to doing business by the corporation"2
must still be fulfilled. Secondly, the Code expressly provides that no par
shares must be issued for a consideration prescribed in the certificate of
incorporation, or in the absence of such a prescription, then for such
consideration as may be fixed by the stockholders or by the board of
19. Although there is disagreement among corporate authorities on the proper
definition of a close corporation, its hallmark is normally the identity between ownership
and active management. Normally, too, the close corporation is one wherein all of
the issued stock is owned by a small number of persons.
20. FLA. STAT. § 608.15 (1955) provides that authorized shares of par value
stock may be issued only for a consideration having a value, in the judgment of the
board of directors, at least equivalent to the full par value of the stock so to be
issued. In the absence of fraud in the transaction, the judgment of the directors
as to the value of the consideration is made conclusive. Conversely, if the incorporators
wish to create a paid-in surplus, they may decide to allocate a lesser number of shares
to themselves at a price in excess of the par value.
21. Apparently, Nebraska is the sole exception. Article XII, § 6 of its constitution
provides that "all stock shall have a face par value; and all stock in the same corporation
shall be of equal value. See also Coodbar, No-Par Stock, Its Nature and Use, 3 MIAMI
LQ (1948).
22. FLA. STAT, § 608.03 (1955). At its 1957 session, however, the Florida Legislature
repealed that provision of the code requiring that "the sum of the values of the
consideration for subscribers' stock shall not be less than the amount of capital with
which the corporation will begin business."
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directors acting pursuant to authority granted by the stockholders or
conferred by the certificate of incorporation. Finally, tax considerations
may affect the decision of whether or not to issue no par value shares.
Frequently statutes attribute to no-par shares, for purposes of computing
organization, original issue, and transfer taxes, an arbitrary value. Fre-
quently, too, this assigned value is considerably higher than the value of
the consideration actually paid for the shares.2 4  Because of these and
other obstacles sometimes placed in the path of no-par shares, attorneys
today increasingly make use of low-par value shares rather than no par
value shares.
Voting and Non-Voting Shares
Assuming that public investors are to be invited to subscribe to
shares in the enterprise, the element of control may be of vital importance
to those persons who organized it. It is apparent that if outsiders are
issued voting shares, those outsiders may have the opportunity to unite
and assume control of the enterprise. Several alternatives present them-
selves at this point from the standpoint of protection of the organizers.
One commonly used protective device simply involves issuance of
fifty-one percent of all voting stock to the organizers. Danger lurks even
here, however, in the fact that one or more of the organizers may sell
or otherwise dispose of their shares to outsiders, thus jeopardizing the
controlling position of the remaining organizers. A partial solution lies
in the careful drafting of a restrictive transfer agreement, a topic to be
discussed shortly. Further objection to fifty-one percent issuance to the
organizers may manifest itself in the form of a cool reception by under-
writers and the public to public offer of the shares for sale; the feeling
may well develop that the organizers are taking "too big a piece" of the
enterprise.
As an alternative, a relatively small number of voting common shares
may be issued to the organizers, while non-voting common shares are
authorized for issuance to outsiders. Use of non-voting common stock
is permissable in Florida.2 5  In this manner the organizers are absolutely
free from interference with their controlling position as long as the voting
shares are not sold or otherwise disposed of to outsiders. Here again,
however, practical objections are presented. Prominent among them is
the likelihood of cool public reception. Especially in the case of common
stock, the public investor is apt to suspect a situation wherein he is given
no voice in management. In addition, if the securities are to be offered
23. FIA. STAT. § 608.15 (1955).
24. See, for example, FLA. STAT. 608.33 (19551, where each share of no par
value is presumed to have a value of "at least $100.00 per share, which presumption
may be overcome by actual proof submitted to the secretary of state." See also FI.A. STAT.
608.5 (1955) (original issue tax).
25. FLA. STAT. § 608.14 (1955). Voting restrictions must be stated in the certificate
of incorporation.
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for sale across state lines, scveral federal statutes restrict the use of non-
voting shares. 1  l"inally, if thc shares are to be listed onl an exchange,
the exchange regulations may prohibit listing of non-voting stock. 2T
Preferred Shares an(d Monds
Still another alternative involves the issuance, to outsiders, of pre-
ferred shares or bonds. In this manner, of course, voting control can be
retained by the organizers. -1 In the opinion of the writer, however,
issuance of preferred shares or bonds by a new enterprise is unwise finan-
cial practice. Preferred shares and bonds represent investment, not specu-
lative, media. Since ]uost new ventures are speculative, proper securities
for public subscriptionl are common stocks, not bonds or preferreds. Thc
Florida Securities Commission has taken this position in a recent policy
release, stating that: "The Commission does not look with favor upon
new corporations issuing interest securities or preferred stock, except in
rare cases which are justified by a reasonable excess of assets over liabilities
to the extent of meeting principal requirements."2 9
Aside from this administrative policy objection, however, there are
practical and seemingly convincing arguments, especially against the issu-
anice of bonds, even by many "seasoned" corporations. First and most
important, in corporate enterprise, the need for management appreciation
of the danger of going into debt is urgent. In deciding what type of
securities to issue, undue weight is often given to that section of the
Internal Revenue Code which permits corporations to deduct interest
paid on their outstanding dcbts."" Dividends paid on common and pre-
ferred shares, of course, are not deductible. But what is often overlooked
is the simple fact that the bond represents a debt-fixed obligation, pay-
able at all events on a stated date. To a new enterprise such a security
may well prove disastrous. Even a going concern should not go into debt
unless absolutely necessar.:1
26. In a reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act, the reorganized corporation
may not issue non-voting stock. Bankruptcy Act § 216(12), 52 STAT. 895 (1938),
11 U.S.C. § 616 (1952). A similar provision is included in the Public Utility Holding
Company Act § 7, 49 STAT. 815 (1935). 15 U.S.C. § 77g(c) (1952). The Investment
Company Act § 18(i) (j), 54 STAT. 877 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80-a-18 (i) (1952)
requires that, with stated exceptions, all newly issued stock be voting stock.
27. Statement of Listing Requirements, New York Stock Exchange (May 4, 1940);
Statement of Policy of Committtec on Listing re Voting Rights, New York Curb
Exchange (Nov. 12, 1946).
28. This statement assumes, of course, that the preferred shareholders or bondholders
are not granted voting rights.
29. Ha. Sec. Comm. Release No. 18 (Sept. 7, 1956).
30. INT. RFV. CODE OF 1939, § 23(b), 53 STAT. 12 (Now INr. REv. CODE orF
1954, §§ 163, 265).
31. An even stronger position on this point is taken by the American Institute
of Management: "The Institute's own analysis further strengthens the obvious con-
clusion that there is an over-reliance on debt financing today-and a trend toward
even greater reliance on debt. True, business is prosperous . . . but business has
expanded at the expense of its creditors." The Doubtful Value of Corporate Debt,
American Institute of Management (May, 1953).
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Assuming then, that the enterprise, especially the new corporation,
will authorize and issue cquity securities rather than fixed interest obliga-
tions, draftsmanship becomes exceedingly important if the objective is
the usual one-maintenance of control among the organizers.
IV. lESTRaICTIvE 'RANSFER' AGREEMENTS
Faced with the previously discussed possibility of mobilization by
outsiders in the event that the controlling shares are sold or otherwise
disposed of, the organizers may nevertheless effectively achieve retention
of control by means of a carefully drawn restrictive transfer agreement.32
The objective of this agreement is to insure that any portion of the
controlling shares will be offered to the other organizers or to the cor-
poration prior to being disposed of to outsiders. It is to be noted in this
connection that the agreement must take the form of a first refusal; abso-
lute restraints on alienation of shares arc void."" Similarly, agreements
which make the corporation the only possible purchaser34 or which pro-
hibit the transfer of shares without prior consent of the directors or the
other stockholdersa"- will be held invalid. As long as the restraint is
reasonable, however, it will be upheld.31  Statutory authority for such
restrictions is contained in the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. 7
Precise draftsmanship, however, is necessary, because in construing
such agreements, courts will not enlarge the restrictions by implication.
For example, the agreement should clearly specify whether the restrictions
imposed on transfer of the shares apply only to voluntary inter vivos sales
or also to gifts, testamentary dispositions, intestate successions or other
transfers by operation of law.38 Similarly, are transfers to existing share-
holders or to members of the immnediate family of the transferor within
the scope of the restriction? These points should be expressly dealt with
in the agreement.
Still another factor to be clarified in the restrictive transfer agreement
concerns the optionecs. Is the option to run in favor of all parties to the
agreement? To a selected few? To the corporation? Is there any order
of priority among optionecs? If so, what is the order of priority? Oi
32. The normal procedure involves the drafting of a separate stockholders' agree-
ment, signed by all parties concerned. However, restrictive transfer provisions could be
made a part of the by-laws or even included in the corporate charter. See Annot.
Validity of Restrictions on Alienation or Transfer of Corporate Stock, 65 ALR 1159
(1929 ; 138 ALR 647 (1941).
33. See Greene v. E. H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A.2d 249
(1938); Note, 37 Mic. L. REV. 1140 (1939).
34. Ibid.
35. See Johnson v. Laflin, 103 U.S. 800 (1880).
36. Weissman v. Lincoln Corp., 76 So.2d 478 (Fla. 1954).
37. FLA. STAT. § 614.17 (1955).
38. See Stem v. Stem, 146 F.2d 870 (D.C. Cir. 1944), wherein it was held that
a by-law requirement of a first offer to the corporation did not preveiit a shareholder
from effectively disposing of his shares by testamentary proviin.
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what basis are the optionees given the right to exercise the purchase
option? In answer to this last question, normal participation is based
upon the pro rata share of a stockholder's interest.3
Consideration of an important statutory requirement in connection
with restrictive transfer agreements merits attention. Although, by means
of such agreements, free transferability of shares may be prevented, the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act provides that "there shall be no restriction
upon the transfer of shares . . .unless the restriction is stated upon the
certificate." 40  Accordingly, in order to insure the enforceability of such
agreements against third persons, proper reference to them should be
placed on the face of the stock certificate.
4 '
The next problem which must be dealt with concerns the price at
which the purchase is to be made. Several alternatives are possible: mutual
agreement, book value, capitalization of prior earnings, market value,
arbitration.
The mutual agreement method often leaves much to be desired. In
the first place, an agreement to agree on a fixed price would be unenforce-
able for lack of consideration. 42 On the other hand, an agreement to
purchase and sell at a fixed price determined at the time of making the
agreement is equally unsatisfactory, for the actual value of the shares
may be subject to constant fluctuation.
The book value method of valuation is satisfactory only if the term
"book value" is clearly defined in the agreement. That term, as ordinarily
used in accounting practice, connotes the addition of all tangible assets
of the company, then deducting all debts and other liabilities, plus the
liquidation price of any preferred stock. The sum arrived at is divided
by the number of common shares outstanding, and the result is the book
value per common share. It is at once apparent that book value, as thus
defined, may have little or no significant relationship to the actual value
of the shares. In the first place, intangibles such as good will are excluded
although these intangibles may constitute a very real part of the actual
value of the company. Secondly, neither market appreciation over cost
of fixed assets nor market depreciation is reflected. In periods of rising
(or falling) prices, the true value picture may be badly distorted.43 Unless,
then, the aforementioned factors are dealt with and clearly spelled out
39. See Greenwood v. Rotfort, 158 Fla. 197, 28 So.2d 825 (1946).
40. FLA. STAT. § 614.17 (1955).
41. The terms of the restriction need not be set forth on the certificate. Weissman
v. Lincoln Corp., 76 So.2d 478 (Fla. 1954). See also Note, Restraints on Alienation of
Stock Certificates, 8 FLA. L. REV. 321 (1955).
42. 1 \VLLuSTON, CONTRACTS § 45 (rev. ed. 1936).
43. It should be noted, too, that balance sheet values are subject to adjustment
by the board of directors, thus leaving the selling or purchasing stockholder more or
less at their mercy. See e.g., Drucklieb v. Harris, 209 N.Y. 211, 102 N.E. 599 (1913),
wherein the agreed purchase price was "book value," but action by the directors
reducing such book value by writing down the assets was held valid.
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in the agreement, dissatisfaction and litigation are apt to result if the book
value method is selected.
Capitalization of prior earnings as a criterion for evaluation of the
shares of a business also presents practical difficulties. What particular
period is to be selected? XVhat is its duration? By whom are the annual
earnings to be determined? By what method? These are troublesome
questions. Moreover, if the enterprise is a growing one, it is likely that
future earnings will not properly be reflected in any computation of prior
earnings. Here again, if such a valuation method is used, the just discussed
problems should be clearly defined and solved within the four comers
of the agreement.
The selection of market value as a valuation method is appropriate
if the shares are listed on an exchange or actively traded in the over-the-
counter market.44 The advantage of this method is obvious; an objectively
fixed price for sale or purchase of the shares is, in effect, predetermined.
If, however, the shares are unlisted and not actively traded, as is the
case with most small and close corporations, there is no ready market
and no market value in the arm's length sense.
Finally, a valuation method that has enjoyed considerable popularity
in recent years involves appraisal and arbitration. More specifically, the
agreement, after specifying the manner in which appraisers or arbitrators
are to be selected, 45 usually provides that if the arbitrators can agree on a
price, that price shall be conclusive. In the event that the two arbitrators
cannot agree, the agreement commonly provides that they shall choose a
third party as umpire, and the decision of the majority shall fix a price.
In summation, the selection of a valuation method will depend upon
the nature of the business and the character of its assets. The writer has
found that a combination of the book value method and the arbitration
method provides the most workable solution for the average small cor-
porate business. For example, if book value is clearly defined, as suggested
in the preceding discussion, that method can be effectively applied to
tangible assets of the business, while the arbitration method can, at the
same time, be applied to the company's intangible assets such as good
will.
As stated previously, the restrictive transfer agreement may provide
that, before being disposed of to outsiders, the shares must first be offered
either to the corporation or to the other shareholders. If the corporation
is granted first refusal, the governing state statutes should be checked to
ascertain whether the corporation is permitted to purchase its own
44. On all active unlisted securities daily bid and asked prices may be obtained
from the National Daily Quotation Sheets ("pink sheets") published by the National
Association of Securities Dealers.
45. A suggested approach grants to each of the parties involved the right to
appoint an arbitrator.
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shares. Statutes throughout the country are not uniform in this respect,
some limiting the purchase of shares from surplus,4 6 others permitting
purchase from capital under certain restrictions. Some few states abso.
lutely forbid corporations to purchase their own stock.47 The general rule
may now be said to be that in the absence of any express statutory pro-
hibitions, or restrictions against such purchases in the corporate charter
or by-laws, every corporation has the power in good faith to purchase its
stock out of surplus.
In addition, as between parties to the agreement, it is specifically
enforceable. Since there is no readily available market, and in many in-
stances no market at all, in which the corporation or other shareholders
could purchase shares and then recover damages in a lawsuit, specific
performance is the only adequate remedy. As stated in a leading case: "An
action at law to recover damages for breach of the contract would not
afford adequate remedy but, in effect, destroy the very purpose of the
agreement by opening the way for holding of the stock by third persons."4 8
V. PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHTS
Another control device to which serious attention should be given
in draftsmanship during the organizational stage concerns pre-emptive
rights. It is obvious that if the capital stock is increased by the authoriza-
tion and issuance of new shares of the same class as that held by an
organizer, the organizer's political position in the corporation will be
placed in jeopardy in the absence of some protective device. Accordingly,
statutes in most states expressly grant pre-emptive rights to corporate
shareholders. Such rights entitle the original shareholders to subscribe
to the new stock issue in preference to outsiders and on an equal basis
with other original shareholders in proportion that the amount of shares
owned or held by him bears to the total outstanding amount of such
shares.40 It is to be noted that the language of the Florida statute limits
the pre-emptive right to "the sale for cash ... ."5 Stock issued for services
or property, then, would not be subject to pre-emptive rights nnless appro-
priate restrictions were included in the by-laws or in a separate stock-
holders agreement.'
Legal problems, however, have, for the most part, arisen in connection
with interpretation of that clause of the statute reading, "of any new stock
46. LAt. S'r^'r. 1 608.13 (1955).
47. For a complete review of statutes and decisions, see 6A FLETCHER, CORPORA-
TIONS §§ 2845-2861 (perm. ed. 1950).
48. Bohnsack v. Detroit Trust Co., 292 Mich. 167, 169, 290 N. W. 367, 369 (1940).
49. FLA. STAT. j 608.42 (1955).
50. Ibid.
51'. If either of these methods is used, proper reference should be placed upon
the stock certificates. See discussion concerning restrictive transfer agreements suopra...
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of the same kind, class or series as that which hc already holds." First of
all, what is meant by "new" stock? Docs the word "new" refer only to
newly authorized and issued stock or also to previously authorized but newly
issued stock? Cases in other jurisdictions arc in hopeless conflict ol this
point 2  In Rowland v. Times Publishing Co., a the directors sold previ-
ously authorized but unissued shares to certain minority shareholders for
the purpose of giving them control to the exclusion of a majority share-
holder. In holding this transaction invalid and subject to cancellation in
equity, the Supreme Court of Florida, in effect, extended pre-emptive right
protection to new issues of originally authorized shares. 4
Next, the words, "same kind, class or series as that which he already
holds" have caused considerable interpretative difficulties. Is a holder of
common shares entitled to pre-emptive rights, for example, on the new
authorization or issuance of preferred shares? The above statutory language
would seem to give a clear negative answer. Suppose, however, that Mr.
A holds voting common shares of XYZ, Inc. Is he entitled to pre-emptive
right protection on the new authorization or issuance of non-voting common
shares of YXZ, Inc.? True, he does hold the same "kind" of shares
(common), although not the same "class." Yet, his political position is
in no way weakened by issuance of non-voting common shares.5 5
Once the corporate attorney has the objective of the proposed organi-
zation clearly in mind, these problems of statutory construction can be
avoided by careful draftsmanship of the by-laws. Any pre-emptive right
restrictions which are included in the by-laws, however, should be properly
referred to on the stock certificate.A
Finally, it should be noted that pre-emptive rights may be denied
altogether if an appropriate provision to that effect is included in the
certificate of incorporationY In some instances this procedure may be
advisable. Suppose, for example, that a public offering of securities is con-
templated. Compliance with pre-emptive rights provisions may hinder or
delay the offering. In general, underwriters of a public issue will not take
52. See Dunlav v. Avenue M. Garage & Repair Co., 253 N.Y. 274, 170 N.E.
917 (1930); Schwab v. Schwab-Wilson Mach. Corp., 13 Cal. App.2d 1, 55 P.2d 1268
(1936); Titus v. Paul State Bank, 32 Idaho 23, 179 Pac. 514 (1919).
53. 160 Fla. 465, 35 So.2d 399 (1948).
54. While it is true that this case was decided under former FLA. STAT. §§ 612.20,
612.26 (1955), the words "new stock" have not been changed by amendment. FLA.
STAT. § 608.42 (1955).
55. This troublesome question has been answered in different ways. See Frey,
Shareholders' Pre-empitive Rights, 38 YALE L. J. 563, 577 (1929).
56. See FtA. STAT. § 614.17 (1955) and note 51 sn/pra.
57. FLA. STAT. § 608.42 (1955).
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kindly to pre-emptive rights provisions, but may insist that such rights
be waived before the underwriting is commenced? 8
CONCLUSION
The practice of corporate law involves a maximum of precise and prac-
tical draftsmanship, within the framework of existing statutes, rules, regu-
lations and court decisions. It is the sincere hope of the writer that attorneys,
especially those attorneys to whom the practice of corporate law is new,
will in some way be benefited hv this article and an application of its
principles.
58. Such a waiver would first have to be approved by shareholders whose rights
were adversely affected. See FLA. STAT. § 608.18 (1955).
